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1. Introduction
Air passenger traffic in the United States showed remarkable growth during the
economic expansion of the 1980's. Each day a million and a quarter passengers
board commercial flights. The boom coincided with the advent of airline
deregulation in 1978. This drastic change in the industry has inspired professional
and newspaper articles, graduate student theses, and books which have discussed
the causes, effects, costs, and benefits of deregulation with predictably mixed
conclusions. Economists, who like to predict the future by exercising econometric
models, are finding that conditions in air transportation have become too dynamic
(chaotic?) for their models to cope. Certainly the future of the air transportation
industry is unclear. There has been, however, an unmistakable trend toward
oligopoly, or, as industry spokesmen describe it, "hardball competition among the
major airlines." This trend has been accompanied by formations of hub fortresses
owned by these survivors.
Air traffic has always been concentrated in a few large cities; airplanes will go where
there is a demand for them. But airline (rather than traffic) hubs have created
artificial demand. Up to seventy percent of travellers boarding airplanes in the hub
cities do not live anywhere near these cities - in fact, they may have no idea at
which airport they are changing planes. Most passengers do not care, while travel
cognoscenti soon learn to avoid certain airports (and airlines which frequent these
airports). A hub airport is a frenzy of activity for short periods of time during the
day, as complexes of airplanes descend, park and interchange passengers, and take
off. Then the airport lies quietly. If observers were to arrive at a major hub between
times of complexes, they would be perplexed to hear that "this is one of the most
congested airports in the world."
Thus congestion and its evil twin, delay, are not constants in the system. Rather,
they appear only if a number of conditions conspire to manifest themselves
simultaneously, or nearly so. First, the weather must deteriorate from visual flight
conditions to instrument flight conditions. Then, this must occur near peak
demand conditions at the airport. Of course, some airports in the Unites States are
2always near peak conditions, among them the so-called slot constrained airports:
New York's La Guardia and Kennedy, Washington's National, and Chicago's
O'Hare. When weather goes bad at these airports or other major hubs during
complexes, ripple effects start nearly all over the country, because some airlines
have now designed schedules to maximize utilization of their airplanes. Very little
slack time is built into the schedules to account for potential delays, although
"block-time creep" exists: the phenomenon that travellers discover when they
arrive at their destinations ahead of schedule (if they happen to leave on time).
This "creep" protects the airlines from being branded as laggards by the DOT's
Consumer On-Time Performance Data hit list.
Thus a combination of management practices by airlines (which place great demand
on terminal airspace over a concentrated period of time) and mother nature (which
provides currently unpredictable behavior of weather near the airport) conspire to
limit the capabilities to handle arrivals and departures at various airports below the
numbers that had been scheduled. Travellers complain that the schedules aren't
being met, and if enough people complain to Congress, or if the travellers
themselves happen to be members of Congress, a national problem appears.
How much of a problem is this? In 1988 there were 21 airports, according to the
FAA, which exceeded 20,000 hours of annual aircraft delay, perhaps 50,000 hours per
year, or 140 hours per day. (One, Chicago's O'Hare, exceeded 100,000 hours.) These
airports, in turn, averaged 1,000 operations (arrivals and departures) per day, so that
each operation would have averaged about 8 minutes of delay. At O'Hare, for
example, 6% of all operations experienced in excess of 15 minutes of delay. (In
excess means just that - there is no knowledge of how much "in excess" is.)
Conversely, this means that at that most congested airport in the United States, 94%
of all airplanes arrive or depart with less than 15 minutes of delay. However, airline
delay statistics may be similar to the apocryphal story of the Boy Scout troop which
drowned wading across a creek which averaged two feet in depth.
There are estimates that on a dollar basis, delay accounts for a $3 billion cost to
airlines, or a net societal cost of $5 billion if travellers' wasted time is included.
Since in their best years U.S. airlines make about $3 billion in profit, reducing delay
is a sure-fire way for airlines to climb out of their all too frequent financial morasses,
as well as diminishing their passenger frustrations.
Even though all of the numbers mentioned in the paragraphs above are subject to
substantial caveats, it is indisputable that on certain days during the year the air
transportation system seems to come to a crawl, if not a halt. Travellers either find
themselves sitting at airport lounges observing cancellation and delay notices
appearing on the departure and arrival screens, or sitting in airplanes (on runways
or at gates) being told that there is an "air traffic delay." Old-timers grumble that the
only difference twenty years of technology improvements has made to the U.S.
airspace system is that the wait is now on the ground instead of circling in the air
near their destinations.
To the casual observer, it would appear that a number of solutions exist to solve this
problem. The most obvious is to pour more concrete: more airports, more and
longer runways, more taxiways, more gates and terminals. This is analogous to
widening highways and building more interstates for ground transportation
congestion. The concrete solution, alas, runs into both financial and citizen
roadblocks. It is very expensive - the latest airport coming off the drawing boards
(Denver International) carries a tag of some $2 billion, with about $400 million of
that in bonds being backed by a new funding creature, the Passenger Facility Charge
(a head tax of up to 3 dollars assessed to every passenger enplaning at an airport -
voluntary or not). The citizen roadblock is community objections to airport
noisiness. The bill creating the PFC in 1990 also carried with it a mandate for the
FAA to create a national noise policy so that individual airports would not wreak
havoc with the whole system by creating their own local operational rules, such as
curfews. The bill also attempted to pacify airport neighborhoods by setting a
deadline for all U.S. aircraft to be quiet(er) - complying with Stage 3 regulations by
the year 2000.
More damaging than financial difficulties are the anti-noise sentiments, and the
concomitant not-in-my-backyard syndrome, that are at the forefronts of protests of
either an alert citizenry, or New Age Luddites, when any expansion plans are made
public. Whatever one's view, it is a crowd vocal and seemingly powerful enough in
local political circles to stop any large- scale progress to ground solutions of the
congestion problem. That, then, leaves the air.
It is intuitive that if airplanes were closer spaced than they are now, much more
traffic would move through a given area in the same amount of time, and
consequently airplanes would land (and take off) quicker, reducing any waiting
(queue) time. This obviously increases airport noise levels. There are two problems
with this approach. The first trick is to accomplish this safely. Safety has at least two
dimensions: there is the physical, i.e., airplanes should not run into each other (or
the ground, as a result of weather disturbances and wake vortices); and pilots (and
controllers) should feel they are still in control of the situation, even after
separation standards are reduced. The first aspect is mostly a matter of technology,
the second mostly a matter of human factors. But if traffic moved quicker and noise
of the aircraft is not reduced, the same citizens who had vehemently opposed the
construction of additional ground facilities would once again rise in righteous anger
and demand a stop to the more efficient techniques of flying airplanes which have
caused an increase in the noise levels in their neighborhood. They, too, must be
considered.
This report will attempt to address some of the issues outlined above. The focus
will be on technology and where it is best suited to provide an equitable and efficient
expansion of capacity in the air transportation system. Ultimately, the discussion
will be centered on NASA's potential contributions to solving the capacity
problem.*
This report was prepared under NASA Grant NAG - 1 - 1149. The authors would like to
acknowledge the guidance and assistance of the NASA Technical Officers for this Grant, Mr.
Matthew M. Winston and Mr. W. Don Harvey of NASA Langley Research Center.
Clare Williman rendered many of the charts, graphs, and tables contained in this report.
2. State of the Union
The air transportation system of the Unites States is huge by any measure. There are
a lot of aircraft out there, most of them general aviation (222,000) and military
(11,000). There are even a lot of rotorcraft: 7,000 civilian and 7,000 military. On the
public side, the commuter fleet consists of 2,000 aircraft of various sizes from 8-seat
props to 100-seat jets, while the commercial airline fleet contains about 4,000 jets. In
1990, U.S. airlines flew about 300 billion revenue passenger miles domestically (up
from 100 billion in 1970), and another 100 billion internationally, while the airlines
of the rest of the world flew 700 billion rpms.
While there are 17,000 airports in the U.S., only some four hundred have
commercial service (Figure 1). These proportions reflect the general aviation and
commercial uses of the total U.S. aircraft fleet. Only Australia has a similar number
of airports with scheduled flights, while countries with large populations such as
China, India, Indonesia and the old USSR have between 50 and 130 airports.
Enplanements at airports are similarly weighted toward the U.S.; of the top ten
airports in the world, Chicago (ORD), Dallas-Fort Worth, Los Angeles (LAX) and
Atlanta are the top four, interrupted by London (Heathrow), Tokyo (Haneda), -
followed by New York (JFK), San Francisco, Denver and finally Frankfurt. These
numbers simply reaffirm that it is a country's GNP that drives aviation activity,
rather than population or land area.
Airport activity can be characterized by either enplanements or aircraft operations.
In the U.S., if measured by enplanements, the top twenty airports capture over fifty
percent of passenger traffic. If airplanes are counted, the top twenty airports only
account for sixteen percent of operations. This results from general aviation activity
being spread more evenly over U.S. airports, while airline operations are much
more concentrated at the hubs (Table 1). Overall, general aviation activity at the 400
airport traffic control towers across the U.S. has been around 40 million operations
per year, or about 60% of all operations, while air carrier operations are about 20%
(the rest being air taxi (15%) and military (5%), Table 2.)
When the last great airport capacity crunch appeared in the late 1960's, GA was a
favorite villain, but there are very few small aircraft now at the largest hubs (Table
3). Attempts to banish them as a solution to congestion problems no longer have
much merit, not to mention the stiff resistance from the Airplane Owners and
Pilots Association.
In addition to reduced GA activity, the last capacity problem was resolved in part by
growing aircraft size. From 1960, the number of seats per aircraft grew steadily from
65 to 110 in 1970 and finally peaked at 153 in 1983. It has stagnated there since as
major airlines purchased smaller jet transports to feed their hub operations. The
FAA forecasts that seating capacity will increase once again (Figure 2), and with the
reduction in the number of airlines this in turn may alleviate traffic problems at the
airline hubs.
GA operations still constitute a substantial portion of total operations at the good
weather large hub airports (hubs defined by passenger enplanements), such as
Denver, 6th largest hub, 22% GA operations; Phoenix, 8th, 25%; Honolulu, 14th,
25%; Miami, 15th, 19%; Orlando, 18th, 15%; Las Vegas, 21st, 29%. (Tables 4 & 5).
Finally, of the 20 airports which the FAA considers capacity limited, two, Long
Beach and Santa Ana in California, are primarily general aviation airports (82% of
operations at SNA and 93% at LGB) (Tables 5 and 6). Thus lack of capacity is not
considered to be exclusively an air carrier airport problem.
Since the 1960's FAA has also attempted to create capacity through the designation
of some GA airports as reliever airports, which allowed them easier access to FAA
funds. The 1990 FAA Aviation System Capacity Plan notes that, ". . . Reliever
airports can be expected to play significant roles in reducing congestion and delay at
delay-problem airports, especially those where general aviation constitutes a
significant portion (over 25%) of operations." But while reliever airports can
certainly divert more GA traffic from airports which simultaneously have large GA
activity and delay-problems (13 of 41 expected delay problem airports by 1998,
according to the FAA's forecast), these are not the airports that are the problem sites
of the system. The largest delays are at the largest airline hubs, starting with O'Hare
(Figure 3).
Although there was a small amount of airline hubbing before deregulation in 1978
(at Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth and Denver), most trunk airlines were
restricted by their route authority to fly only a few of the denser routes out of major
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TABLE 2. TOTAL NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM ACTIVITY
NPIAS Airports *
Airport Operations (millions)
Aircraft Operations
Itinerant Operations
Instrument Operations
Towered Airport Operations
Military Airport Operations
ARTCC Operations (millions)
IFR Aircraft Handled
ACF Approach Control Operations**
FSS Service (millions)
Flight Plans, Radio Contacts, Briefings
Hours Flown (millions)
Air Carrier
General Aviation
Military
Domestic Enplanements
(Revenue Passenger) (millions)
Air Carrier
Commuter
Aircraft Fleet (thousands)
Air Carrier
Commuter***
1990 1995
3320 3560
143.9
84.6
46.4
62.8
28.6
165.0
99.0
53.4
70.9
29.6
Percent
Growth
2000 2005 1990 -2005
3800 4100
183.8
111.3
58.6
78.0
30.5
201.7
123.2
63.8
84.5
30.5
23.5
40.2
45.6
37.5
34.6
6.6
37.8 42.8 46.9 50.6 33.9
--- --- 58.6 63.8 ---
44.9 45.8 47.1 48.1 7.1
10.6 12.1 13.1 14.2 34.0
34.0 37.0 39.9 41.8 22.9
6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 3.3
430.6 529.6 645.3 849.1 97.2
34.9 49.5 67.3 86.0 146.4
4.1
1.8
4.5
2.0
4.8
2.2
5.2
2.4
26.8
33.3
Total General Aviation
Civil Helicopter***
Total Military
Military Helicopter***
Pilots (thousands)
Instrument Rated
Total Pilots
212.9 218.2 221.7 224.4 5.4
7.0 8.6 10.3 12.1 72.9
19.1 18.1 18.0 18.0
7.4 6.0 6.0 6.0
278.7 297.0 312.0 325.0
704.3 747.2 779.6 811.0
(5.8)
(18.9)
16.6
15.1
* Aircraft operations forecasts are based on the existing airports included in the National Plan on
Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS).
* * Approach control operations conducted for area control facilities equal the number of instrument
operations conducted by towers.
** * Civil helicopter and commuter fleets are included in the Total General Aviation Fleet. The
military helicopter fleet is included in total military fleet.
Source: Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, FAA, December 1990.
TABLE 3.
TOP 25 FAA-OPERATED AIRPORT TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWERS,
BY RANK ORDER OF AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
AND BY AVIATION CATEGORY INCLUDING TOTAL OPERATIONS RANK
FISCAL YEAR 1989
Tower Air Carrier Air General Military Total
Rank Operations Taxi Aviation Rank Operations
Chicago O'Hare Int'l 1 620,090 137,411 28,266 3,587 1 789,384
Dallas Ft. Worth Reg'l 2 505,822 168,258 18,501 1,033 2 693,614
Atlanta International 3 478,290 165,223 24,730 1,300 3 669,543
Los Angeles International 4 427,419 151,785 47,981 5,052 4 632,237
Denver Stapleton Int'l 5 323,165 104,56C 38,911 1,854 9 468,490
San Francisco 6 311,430 85,209 35,096 2,563 11 434,398
P nix Sky Harbor Int'l 7 285,493 66,214 119,977 8,106 8 479,790
St. Louis Int'l 8 283,436 93,644 39,768 8,409 12 425,257
Newark 9 269,839 82,197 24,201 552 23 376,789
Detroit Metro Wayne Co 10 269,199 47,176 52,312 210 25 368,897
La Guardia 11 262,784 65,426 26,904 454 27 355,568
Pittsburgh Greater Int'l 12 249,081 96,751 25,898 6,801 20 378,531
Miami Int'l 13 247,356 55,208 70,541 5,152 21 378,257
Boston Logan 14 239,281 131,519 45,952 319 14 417,111
Minneapolis St. Paul Int'l 15 230,656 76,29C 64,299 4,994 24 376,239
Charlotte Douglas 16 229,199 111,862 79,150 3,806 13 424,017
John F. Kennedy Int'l 17 220,467 91,22C 24,339 705 29 336,731
Houston Intercontinental 18 207,163 44,601 41,217 1,030 36 294,011
Memphis International 19 197,470 58,303 71,731 6,957 30 334,461
Honolulu 20 195,981 67,022 99,641 43,466 15 406,110
Orlando International 21 190,921 48,726 41,558 4,432 38 285,637
Washington National 22 185,580 55,962 74,346 250 33 316,138
Las Vegas McCarran 23 183,362 78,70C 109,022 7,033 22 378,117
Philadelphia Int'l 24 181,342 142,386 57,700 851 19 383,279
... Seattle Tacoma 25 180,145 134,012 13,248 400 31 327,805
Note: Total Operations rank was based on total air traffic activity at 400 FAA-Operated Towers. Air
Carrier operations rank was based on air carrier activity at 309 FAA-Operated Towers. Not all
FAA-Operated Towers handle air carrier operations.
Source: FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, CY 1989
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TABLE 4.
TOP 30 AIRPORTS
IN RANK ORDER BY TOTAL ENPLANED PASSENGERS
LARGE SCHEDULED CERTIFICATED AIR CARRIERS
SCHEDULED AND NONSCHEDULED OPERATIONS
1989
Rank Airport Total Enplaned
Passengers
1 Chicago (O'Hare), IL 25,664,266
2 Dallas/Ft/ Worth (Regional), TX 22,623,065
3 Atlanta, GA 20,397,697
4 Los Angeles, CA 18,583,292
5 San Francisco, CA 13,326,085
6 Denver, CO 12,320,246
7 New York (La Guardia), NY 10,839,833
8 Phoenix, AZ 10,166,095
9 New York (John F. Kenne dy) , NY 10,081,490
10 Newark, NJ 9,822,419
11 Detroit, MI 9,739,265
12 Boston, MA 9,661,258
13 St. Louis, MO 9,396,335
14 Honolulu, Oahu, HI 8,943,521
15 Miami, FL 8,591,936
16 Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN 8,460,115
17 Pittsburgh, PA 7,940,962
18 Orlando, FL 7,373,449
19 Seattle-Tacoma, WA 7,059,777
20 Houston (Intercontinental), TX 7,030,001
21 Las Vegas, NV 7,026,900
22 Charlotte, NC 6,903,482
23 Washington (National), DC 6,895,563
24 Philadelphia, PA 6,247,489
25 San Diego, CA 5,317,177
26 Salt Lake City, UT 5,244,238
27 Washington (Dulles Int'l), DC 4,543,530
28 Baltimore, MD 4,446,139
29 Tampa, FL 4,409,261
30 Kansas City, MO 4,356,991
Source: FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, CY 1989
TABLE 5.
TOP 25 FAA-OPERATED AIRPORT TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWERS,
BY RANK ORDER OF TOTAL OPERATIONS
AND BY AVIATION CATEGORY INCLUDING AIR CARRIER RANK
FISCAL YEAR 1989
Tower Total Air Carrier Air Taxi General Military
Rank Operations Rank Operations Aviation
Chicago O'Hare Int'l 1 789,384 1 620,090 134,441 28,266 3,587
Dallas Ft. Worth Reg'l 2 693,614 2 505,822 168,258 18,501 1,033
Atlanta International 3 669,543 3 478,290 165,223 24,730 1,300
Los Angeles International 4 632,237 4 627,419 151,785 47,981 5,052
Santa Ana 5 533,522 55 62,302 27,727 438,161 5,332
Van Nuy 6 499,087 262 21 774 496,473 1,819
Fort Worth Meacham 7 492,743 235 148 1,599 490,512 484
Phoenix"Sylarbor Int'l 8 479,790 7 285,493 66,214 119,977 8,106
Denver Stapleton Int 9 468,490 5 323,165 104,560 38,911 1,854
Long Beach 10 462,177 94 20,048 7,656 431,683 2,790
San Francisco 11 434,298 6 311,430 85,209 38,096 2,563
St. Louis Int'l 12 425,257 8 283,436 93,644 39,768 8,409
Charlotte Douglas 13 424,017 16 229,199 111,862 79,150 3,806
Boston Loaan 14 417,111 14 239,281 131,519 45,992 319
15 406,110 20 195,981 67,022 99,641 43,466
Seattle Boeing 16 404,626 143 7,934 20,376 373,365 2,951
OaklanlYIternational 17 403,213 49 74,682 57,281 270,284 966
Pontiac 18 401,819 241 114 8,884 392,018 803
Philadelphia Int'l 19 383,279 24 181,342 143,386 57,700 851
Pittsburgh Greater Int'l 20 378,531 12 249,081 96,751 25,898 6801
Miami Int'l .21 378,257 13 247,356 55,208 70,541 5,152
Las Vegas McCarran 22 378,117 23 183,362 78,700 109,022 7,033
Newark 23 376,789 9 269,839 82,197 24,201 552
is St P InYl 24 376,239 15 230,656 76,290 64,299 4994
Detroit Metro Wayne Co 25 368,897 10 269,199 47,176 52,312 210
Note: Total Operations rank was based on total air traffic activity at 400 FAA-Operated
Towers. Air Carrier operations rank was based on air carrier activity at 309 FAA-
Operated Towers. Not all FAA-Operated Towers handle air carrier operations.
FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, FY 1989Source:
Table 6. Airports Currently Experiencing Capacity Problems
(As of Calendar Year 1989)
Atlanta, GA
Burbank, CA
Boston, MA
Chicago, IL
Dallas/Fort Worth, TX
Denver, CO
Houston, TX
Las Vegas, NV
Long Beach, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Hartsfield
Burbank
Logan
O'Hare
International
Stapleton
Intercontinental
McCarran
Dougherty Field
International
Newark, NJ
New York, NY
New York, NY
Philadelphia, PA
Phoenix, AZ
Raleigh, NC
San Francisco, CA
Santa Ana, CA
St. Louis, MO
Washington, DC
International
Kennedy
LaGuardia
International
Sky Harbor
Raleigh-Durham
International
John Wayne
Lambert
National
Source: Aviation System Capital Investment Plan, FAA, December 1990.
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cities. The local service airlines carried the passengers from one of the larger cities
to the smaller airports in the region. Often there was no choice for the passenger,
and if the trunks did have small cities on their route systems, they provided
desultory service, allowing the local service carriers to flourish. The same
phenomenon allowed commuter air carriers to pick off the even smaller cities on
the locals' routes. Prior to deregulation, interlining (i.e., passengers changing
airlines during a trip) amounted to half of all connecting traffic.
After deregulation, not everyone was quick to organize hub-and-spoke networks.
United Airlines' first strategic move was to rid itself of service to smaller cities (and
attempting to discard smaller aircraft) and concentrate on service between larger
cities, depending on the locals to continue to feed United's main routes. But the
locals would no longer play this game and began expanding their networks to carry
"their" (originating) passengers to their final destinations on their new (more
profitable) longer hauls. As locals began gaining market share, United and other
trunks fought back by either buying smaller aircraft and expanding their hub-and-
spoke networks (American Airlines), or by simply buying out the competition
(TWA, Northwest, US Air). Lax enforcement of anti-trust laws and imaginative
marketing techniques (frequent flier miles and yield management) helped the
remaining trunks (now called majors, i.e. airlines with $1 billion in revenue) regain
and exceed their pre-deregulation market share. Although connecting traffic has
remained at around forty percent, there is practically no interlining now, showing
how adept the airlines have become at holding on to their passengers (Figure 4). At
the same time, transfer traffic has created most large traffic hubs by generating
artificially high enplanement counts (Figure 5). Some of the largest hubs have
connecting traffic exceeding originating traffic: SLC, DEN, DFW, STL, ATL, CLT, PIT,
with MSP and ORD close behind. Because of the density of traffic, even in the
coastal cities there are large numbers of passengers changing planes (6 million plus
in New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles), though the transfer percentages are
not high.
As the number of airline hubs has grown from four in 1978 to thirty-two in 1990
(Figures 6 and 7), the percentage of airline traffic touching down at at least one hub
has increased from 50% in 1978 to 88% in 1990 (Figure 8). Since these hubs have
such a large percentage of the total U.S. airline operations, and an even larger
percentage of total passengers, deteriorating weather conditions which always
Figure 4.
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reduce the operational capacity at these airports create traffic jams for aircraft and
travellers all over the U.S. A cursory look at "the capacity problem of the United
States" leads only to the "usual suspects", the large hubs, creating suspicions about
the potential exaggeration of this issue.
Partially to alleviate these dangers of possible overstatements, in almost all
discussions about capacity and delay in the U.S. airspace system, a distressingly large
amount of time is spent on defining the terms in question. Often the discussion
bogs down right from the beginning as the participants are unable to agree on
precise definitions of the very basic words: capacity, delay, and congestion. For
example, the FAA finesses the definition of capacity and congestion altogether:
The first step in a problem-solving exercise is problem definition. This plan defines the
aviation capacity problem in terms of flight delays rather than dealing with the more abstract
"capacity" definition. While it is relatively simple to compute an airport's hourly throughput
capacity (the average number of flight operations which can be handled in IFR or VFR for a
given runway operating configuration), annualizing these numbers is more difficult. The term
"congested airport" is a term of art, not science.1
In general, airport capacity is a function of airport design (number and direction of
runways and taxiways, runway instrumentation, etc.), weather conditions (VFR vs.
IFR and wind directions), aircraft mix, and ATC procedures (sequencing and spacing
of aircraft). When airline and GA activities exceed the ability of the airport to accept
and release aircraft, delays occur. They occur because airlines schedule too many
arrivals and departures during a given time period; because of deteriorating weather
conditions which reduce the runway system capacity; because of the aircraft mix,
both arriving and departing; or, usually, because of some combination of the above
conditions. Thus delay in the most general sense is a function of both capacity and
demand.
1 Federal Aviation Administration, "1990-91 Aviation System Capacity Plan," Washington,
DC, 1990, p. 6-1.
The occurrence of delays is an acknowledged fact. However, it is the magnitude of
the problem, i.e., just how much "time is lost due to delays," that is subject to
question. Over the years, many organizations have tried to quantify delay: the
FAA, the DOT, the airlines, and various airport authorities. Each of these entities
has had a different reason to measure what it perceives to be the critical component
of time lost in unproductive activity. Consequently, each has focused on different
delay statistics.
Airports are generally interested in how much delay occurs within their
jurisdictions (and usually relative to other airports). For example, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey has worked with TWA and American
Airlines at JFK, LGA and EWR since the late 1960's to devise delay statistics which
are used as airport performance measures (Figure 9.). The statistics on arrival and
departure schedule conformity at New York/New Jersey airports have shown
predictable seasonality patterns (increases during winter and summer vacation
seasons at EWR, LGA, and summer international peaks at JFK), superimposed on
unpredictable variations due to aircraft component failure and bad weather. This
type of data shows that most NY/NJ airport delay indicators have remained largely
unchanged from 1985 to 1990.
The three major delay data collection systems have been maintained by the
DOT/FAA. The most recent one, "Air Carrier On-Time Flight Performance Data," is
a result of Congressional pressure on the DOT to give the consumer a better idea of
which carrier (or, at the most detailed level, which flight) meets its schedule best,
both arriving and departing. Data is provided monthly to the DOT by the top dozen
airlines for their schedules into selected (largest) U.S. airports. These numbers do
not have associated with them any causes of delay, and consequently are useless for
air traffic congestion analysis. Furthermore, as is also the case with all other data
bases, mechanical delays are excluded from the DOT data. Only the airlines know
for sure how much of a problem is caused by unreliable aircraft; a commonly
accepted number is 5% of total delays.
The other two delay data bases have been maintained by different branches of the
FAA, Air Traffic Operations Management System (ATOMS) [previously known as
OPSNET and NAPRS] and Standardized Delay Reporting System (SDRS). ATOMS
relies on air traffic controller observations; SDRS relied on delay reports submitted
FIGURE 9.
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by American, Eastern and United Airlines. Each of these systems, while useful in its
way, has some faults when used for airspace capacity definition or analysis.
ATOMS defines a delay as an aircraft flight for which there is a period of 15 minutes
or more between a request for permission to taxi and actual takeoff (departure
delay), a period of 15 minutes (or more) between a request for permission to land
and actual landing (arrival delay), or a departure delay of 15 minutes or more at an
airport because of conditions at a destination airport (gate hold). Some deficiencies
of ATOMS are: (a) it does not include delays shorter than 15 minutes, so that most
delays are never recorded, and the system seriously underestimates total delay; (b) it
fails to track cumulative delays of individual flights; (c) since it depends on
controller observations, the actual gate departure/arrival times are not noted at
those airports where controllers only take over after aircraft reach taxiways; (d) and
since it depends on controller observations, there can be wide variability among
towers depending on how much priority the recording and accuracy of delay data
has. ATOMS confirms that weather is the main culprit in causing delay (Figure 10).
SDRS defined delay as the difference between optimal (nominal) and actual flight
times, to the closest minute, recorded by four phases of flight: gate-hold, taxi-out,
airborne, and taxi-in. The three reporting airlines and the FAA agreed upon
nominal intervals (for each aircraft type) and for individual airport procedures; if
there was a deviation during each phase from the nominal it was considered as
delay. (A nominal flight time from gate to gate was the time it should take without
other aircraft in the system or problems with ATC equipment or weather.) The
system only reported where delay occurred, not the cause: for example, delay in the
air can be caused by ground congestion at the destination, gate-holds can be caused
by congestion at the departure airport, en route airspace, or destination airport
congestion. (There was a bias built into the system if an airport had multiple
terminal entry points and only one runway configuration was considered as
standard.) The SDRS data did not reflect at all variations in flight times from airline
flight schedules; it only reflects the ability of the ATC system to deal with aircraft
once they are accepted into the system by the FAA. Since the demise of Eastern and
drop-out of United, SDRS is now simply an historical record. SDRS indicated that
airline delays averaged 11.8 minutes per flight in 1980 and 15.6 in 1988, with most of
the increase taking place before 1987.
Figure 10.
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Airport capacity is not a single number, nor is the U.S. airport system capacity a
summation of mythical individual airport capacities. Capacity definitions begin
with runway capacity. One practical definition is "maximum throughput" or
"saturation" hourly capacity, the number of operations that can be conducted
during an hour at a runway without violating ATC rules and assuming continuous
aircraft demand. Since larger separations (in distance) exist between aircraft arrivals
and longer (in time) between aircraft departures exist in IFR than in VFR (assuming
the same aircraft mix), there will be different IFR and VFR hourly capacities for a
single runway. While single runway capacities only vary by some 25% depending
on visual conditions, dual runways have more than 50% differences, presaging the
much larger total airport capacity variations (Figures 11, 12 and Table 7).
Given a set of runways at an airport, airplanes can land using different
combinations of runways depending on wind direction, wind speed, and visibility
conditions. Length of runways is also important if the aircraft mix at the airport is
such that some aircraft require specific runways, i.e., heavy long range aircraft need
long runways. Major airports may have fifty or more combinations of runway use,
and each of these has some capacity number attached to it. Furthermore, since
practically all the factors that affect airport capacity are variable, hourly capacity itself
is highly variable. Usually the stated capacity is the long term average value; strictly
speaking it is a capacity estimate of any given configuration, because it is also
changeable depending on demand, i.e., aircraft mix.
For a given set of weather conditions, several configurations are available to be used
for operations, one of which will have the largest capacity. By using these
maximum values, and correlating them with the percentage of time that these
weather conditions are likely to exist, a "Capacity Coverage Curve" can be
constructed. It describes the maximum hourly capacity available at the airport as the
percentage of time during a year (although any period of time is acceptable).
Figure 13 shows the capacity coverage curve for Boston Logan Airport. In VFR
weather, which exists at Boston during 40% of the year, the capacity is 126 operations
per hour. Crosswinds then occur on various runways during another 40% of the
year which make them unavailable for use and the hourly capacities continue to
decrease. Some 2% of the year the airport is closed due to poor visibility, ceilings,
Figure 11.
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Figure 12.
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TABLE 7-
COMPARISON OF TODAY'S VFR
AND IFR AIRFIELD CAPACITIES
Source: MITRE MTR-87W203, October 1987.
| TYPE OF OPERATION
50% Arrivals,
RUNWAY Arrivals - Only 50% Departures Departures - Only
CONFIGURATION VFR I IFR Difference VFR I I FR Difference VFR I IFR Difference
(aircraft/hr) (percent) (aircraft/hr) (percent) (aircraft/hr) - (percent)
Single 36.6 26.6 10.0 (-27%) 59.8 53.2 6.6 (-11%) 57.9 54.8 3.1 (-5%)
Dual 70.6 26.6 44.0 (-62%) 113.4 53.2 60.2 (-53%) 111.9 54.8 57.1 (-51%)
Dependent 73.2 36.9 36.3(-50%) 119.6 73.8 45.8 (-38%) 115.9 109.6 6.3 (-5%)
Parallel
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and snow. There is a wide variation in hourly capacity from 126 to 55 operations per
hour before the airport is closed. A smaller variation exists at airports which either have
very good weather or a small number of runways; such a level capacity coverage curve
means more predictable operations and allows schedules to be set which are more
predictable, at least from the airside capacity supply point of view.
Improvements in ATC procedures or building new runways will raise the overall level
of the capacity coverage curve, i.e., the maximum number of operations per hour will
increase, but unless the weather itself can be managed, degradation of capacity with
weather will continue to take place. Delays at major hubs where weather variations exist
will continue to be inevitable unless traffic is scheduled to match bad weather capacities.
This would not be sensible since it would result in an enormous reduction in usable
capacity.
Logan Airport can accommodate daily demand comfortably under good conditions and
almost all demand under reduced conditions. Only under "unfavorable" conditions
does the airport become a problem (Figure 14). For major hubs like LaGuardia, O'Hare,
Chicago or Atlanta where traffic is running near peak capacity conditions all day, almost
any weather degradation will cause delays to start to mount (Figure 15).
Thus airlines (in the aggregate at an airport) must decide where the tradeoff exists
between not using good weather capacity and the delays likely if scheduling is done in
excess of bad weather capacity.
Even under good weather conditions the highest capacity configuration may not be in use
if runways are chosen based on noise considerations. Normally this does not occur when
traffic demand is high; on the other hand, when demand does not approach the available
capacity of a number of configurations, the one with the highest capacity may not be the
one chosen by the ATC controllers. If an airport chooses the lowest noise configuration
available rather than the highest capacity available, as traffic builds up or as weather
changes, additional changes occur which are not anticipated under the assumptions of the
capacity coverage curve. Some trade-offs between environmental and capacity
considerations may have to be made by the airport as a result of community pressures. A
majority of all hub airports impose some operating restrictions based on noise, including
curfews and maximum noise exposure rules (Figure 16). The large hubs with the greatest
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FIGURE 15.
Hourly Profile of Scheduled Arrivals and Departures
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Figure 16.
Noise Based Operating Restrictions At Hub Airports
Source: Emily A. White, TRB Annual Meeting Session 46, 1991.
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amount of operations and the longest delays are also the points where the greatest
impact of noise restrictions exist.
How much delay can be tolerated by the travelling public, the management of
airlines, and the air traffic controllers? Anecdotal evidence indicates not much
more. Charles Kuralt speaks for the public that flies a lot when he contemplates
another hub in the making: "At friendly little old Raleigh-Durham ... American
Airlines, which never even bothered to fly to Raleigh-Durham in the nice days,
now deposits thousands of passengers there whether they want to be there or not,
and after an hour or two, at its convenience, picks most of these same people up and
flies them somewhere else. Raleigh and Durham are very proud that their airport is
now a hub. So far, it's not a big enough hub to be notorious, but it's growing and
may yet become nationally despised ... The country cheered when Ronald Reagan
fired all those uppity air traffic controllers, and now -- how many years later? -- the
captain is still on the intercom: 'Well, we're 13th in line to take off, folks."'
Airline managements are not happy either. Even though the numbers are
imprecise, the cost of delays to the airlines was in the vicinity of one billion dollars
in 1976, and has been climbing toward two billion (Figure 17), numbers in the same
ball park as the best yearly profit of all airlines ($3b) in 1988. Cutting the cost of
delays might even bring economic health to a staggering industry.
1 New York Times, October 14, 1990, p. 37.
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3. Current Activities in Capacity Improvement
Since the FAA is generally responsive to the users of the airspace that is oversees, it
has not been idle as traffic has been increasing in the last dozen years. New
equipment has been installed at airports, runways or runway extensions have been
funded, and plans exist for further major infrastructure upgrades. The latest (1991)
version is the "Aviation System Capital Investment Plan." While capacity is a key
element of any future plans, at the same time the FAA must overcome the day-to-
day delay problems. Certainly improvements in the Central Flow Control System
have helped to keep down airborne delay, albeit at a cost in increased ground delay.
Until the terminal air traffic control automation (TATCA) and automated en route
ATC (AERA) projects, as well as the on-again, off-again MLS, are completed, the
FAA is working on runway oriented procedural improvements that could increase
runway capacities. The intent of these improvements is to bring IFR capacity closer
to VFR capacity, and at some airports IFR operations could approach VFR
operations. However, on an annual basis the improvements in capacity may not be
that impressive since IFR conditions only exist for a small portion of the year.
These methods are summarized in Table 8. Almost all of the top 100 airports will
have some improvement if and when those procedures are implemented.
Additionally there are FAA sponsored projects for airfield and facility
improvements at various airports throughout the US, although prospects for
runway construction at the most critical airports are not promising because of noise-
fed community opposition to expansion. There may be less opposition at newly
established hubs (such as Raleigh, Charlotte, etc.) where the community is, at least
for now, happy to get the extra benefits of increased service. Figure 18 shows some
potential new hubs that have been identified by the FAA.
Thus noise is not only the key to new airport construction, but also to
improvements at existing airports. Stage 3 is not going to be the answer; for
example, Figure 19 shows that the expected impact of elimination of Stage 2 aircraft
by the year 2000 at Newark will be minimal. Those communities around Newark
which were noise free until the FAA's Expanded East Coast Plan (and its revisions)
came along are now particularly vociferous, as are all communities which suddenly
TABLE 8. METHODS TO INCREASE CAPACITY AT EXISTING AIRPORT'S
Method Description Application
Dependent parallel
IFR approaches
Independent parallel
IFR approaches
Dependent converging
IFR approaches
Independent
converging IFR
approaches
Triple IFR
approaches
Existing rules require that the separation
between parallel runways be at least
2,500 ft for dependent IFR operations
with 2.0 nautical miles (nmi) diagonal
separation between landing aircraft.
Recent studies show that this diagonal
separation could be safely changed to 1.5
nmi.
Separation between parallel runways must
be at least 4,300 ft for simultaneous
independent IFR operations. The FAA is
actively pursuing ways to change this
separation standard to a goal of between
2,500 and 3,000 ft. This may permit an
increase of 12 to 17 operations per hour
under IFR.
The objective is to lower the runway
visibility minima for approaches to
converging runways. Preliminary studies
indicate that dependent approaches to
converging runways can be safely
conducted in ceilings down to Category 1
Minimum Decision Height (200 ft.).
Under VFR it is common to use
nonintersecting converging runways for
independent streams of arriving aircraft.
In IFR this practice is restricted to
decision heights above 200 ft.
Development of new procedures to ensure
safety in the event of simultaneous
missed approaches would allow
independent converging IFR approaches
down to Category 1 Minimum Decision
Height (200 ft)
If IFR approaches to triple runways (using
either the current 4,300-ft lateral
separation standard or the proposed
3,000-ft standard) were permitted,
airports could achieve up to a 50 percent
increase in IFR arrival capacity.
27 of the top 100 airports
have or plan to have
parallel runways with
spacing of 1,000 to 2,499
feet and are candidates
for dependent parallel
IFR approaches.
Among the top 100 airports,
28 have or plan to have
parallel runways with
spacings between 3,000
and 4,299 ft.
Among the top 100 airports,
58 are candidates for
dependent converging
approaches.
Among the top 100 airports,
33 are candidates for
independent converging
IFR approaches.
Among the top 100 airports,
10 are candidates for
triple IFR approaches.
Source: Airport System Capacity, TRB, 1990
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become impacted by noise when the FAA tries to change flight paths and spread
noise around more evenly. It is a no-win proposition and routes may become
established on a least-complaint basis. In order to placate its communities, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey is planning to issue stricter rules on Stage 2
aircraft to the airlines serving its airports and thus superseding the FAA's new noise
rules. The FAA will undoubtedly contest the Port Authority in court.
There are a number of problems that have to be addressed in the noise area, aside
from the level of noise (dB) itself. One issue is the method of determining the noise
footprint area, which uses an average noise level over a twenty-four hour period
(DNL 65dB). ("If a stick of dynamite blew up once a day outside my front door, it
would be nonexistent, according to the way the FAA does things."' )
The DNL 65dB also makes no distinction as to the type of area being overflown, i.e.,
urban areas, which have a lot of ambient noise, and rural areas, which are generally
noise free, are assumed to be similarly impacted. And if more operations of Stage 3
aircraft are scheduled because they theoretically produce the same footprint as those
of fewer Stage 2 aircraft, people will be fully aware of this, since annoyance is not
just related to the level of noise but also to the frequency of flights. Clearly the
current footprint definitions do not impress the airport neighborhoods. It will not
do for the FAA to simply declare that communities are not experiencing "significant
aircraft noise" because they are outside some arbitrary noise footprint defined by
inadequate measures.
"Noise is the major issue in airport expansion," says Kenneth Feith, a senior
scientist and noise specialist with the EPA. "As it is, airports have to conform to
thirty-seven categories of noise 'procedures,' including state and local noise
ordinances, restrictions against specific aircraft types, weight limitations, thrust
requirements, and night-time curfews."2
"The New Yorker", October 21, 1991, p. 32.
2 "Cut Out That Racket", Atlantic Monthly, November 1991, p. 54.
Even when alternative transportation systems are discussed as an answer to the
capacity problem, noise still remains an overriding issue. A variety of vertical and
short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) concepts have been touted since the 1960s as the
solution to the crowded sky.
Of the V/STOL family, the only successful VTOL aircraft has been the helicopter,
which unfortunately has operating costs which are about three times higher than a
similarly sized turboprop aircraft. Few helicopter airlines have been profitable, even
with subsidies from governments or airlines. Thus the tiltrotor concept came about
as an attempt to merge vertical and level flight. The tiltrotor is an aircraft which has
a pivoting engine and rotor combination mounted on each wingtip, operates like a
helicopter when the rotors are vertical (powered lift) and like an airplane when the
rotors are horizontal (wing lift). The basic advantages of a tiltrotor over a helicopter
are increased speed and range. The economics of the tiltrotor are still unknown,
although they are likely to be more similar to a helicopter's than a turboprop's due
to the additional complexities -- vertical lift, which eliminates the need for runways,
does not come cheap. Some of the additional capabilities that this extra cost buys
are: automatic hands-off, stabilized hover in gusty winds; automatic steep,
decelerating descents; speeds up to 300 mph cruising at altitudes between ten and
twenty thousand feet with a 300-500 nm range; and cross-shafting, automatic reserve
thrust for single engine failures.
Tiltrotor technology has a long history. In the 1950's NACA and the military
supported research on advanced helicopters, compound helicopters, tilt wings, tilt
rotors and direct jet lift. In the 1960's V/STOL studies continued for both civil and
military applications. In the 1970's NASA, with DOD support, built a tiltrotor
prototype, the XV-15, and flight test demonstrations began in 1977. In 1983 the DOD
(Navy) awarded the JVX contract to Bell and Boeing, followed by a full scale
development contract for the V-22 in 1986 with an order for six prototypes. The first
flight of the V-22 (with transition from helicopter to airplane) took place in March
1989. In the meantime, research on advanced tiltrotor concepts continues, such as
Sikorsky's variable diameter (telescoping) rotors to achieve greater efficiency in the
airplane mode.
In 1970 a three year long investigation by the old Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
into the need and feasibility for V/STOL service in the Northeast Corridor
concluded that "... it is essential that V/STOL operations be segregated from CTOL
(conventional) from the outset." But despite the advocacy of the CAB no scheduled
V/STOL operations resulted from the Northeast Corridor study, nor from many
others, the latest of which was the civil tiltrotor (CTR) study finished in early 1991 by
Boeing. Just as in all the previous studies, it found a need for a vertiport in New
York City and the other major cities in the Northeast. However, cities apparently do
not believe in the maxim "If you build it, it will come," since no vertiport network
has been established.
In 1970 the risk for the airlines was" ... buying a new aircraft technology to operate
into a facility that is not yet built to serve an unknown level of traffic at a yet to be
determined fare."1 Since then airline traffic has almost doubled, so the Boeing study
forecasts a need for 1,200 CTR aircraft by the year 2000 in North America alone
(Figure 20); even under 1989 traffic conditions some 1,000 departure slots could be
diverted from the major Northeast airports if a tiltrotor network existed. Such a
potential reduction of air traffic delays argues strongly for tiltrotor technology. Table
9 summarizes CTR system issues. However,
"Tiltrotor aircraft, which will cost more to purchase and operate than
conventional airplanes and will require new infrastructure, turn few heads in
airline management. Before an airline will consider placing orders for a
commercial tiltrotor, it must be convinced that the aircraft is operationally
reliable and economically viable."2
While the FAA must necessarily take the major initiatives toward improving
capacity, there is a wealth of technical talent available at other civilian agencies of
the U.S. government to help in their efforts, as well as the Defense Department. For
example, the Next-Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD), a long range Doppler
radar system, now being installed and known as WSR-88D, was a tri-agency
development of Commerce (NOAA-NWS), Transportation (FAA), and Defense
1 "Space / Aeronautics", May 1970, p. 31.
2 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Ways: Tiltrotor Aircraft and
Magnetically Levitated Vehicles OTA-SET-507, October 1991, p. 53.
FIGURE 20.
NORTH AMERICA: CTR PROJECTED SYSTEM IN THE YEAR 2000 (PASSENGER)
SOURCE: Boeing, NASA CR 177576, Feb. 1991
TABLE9
TILTROTOR SYSTEM ISSUES
Component Issues Comments
Tiltrotor aircraft
Vertiport
ATC system
Regulatory
oversight
Potential
operators
Local
communities
Passengers
Financiers and
investors
V-22 program status; need for a civil
demonstration program; commercial
market size.
Federal airport capital grant policy for
vertiports is unclear; sites that are
acceptable to communities and are
operationally suitable depend in part
on new technologies and flight
procedures.
Appropriate technology, procedures,
and manpower needed to gain
benefits of tiltrotor flight capabilities.
Large increase in the number of
daily en route flights possible.
Cockpit design and pilot training; noise
standards for tiltrotor and vertiports.
Major airlines have not embraced
tiltrotor. Are potential tiltrotor
system benefits realizable for an
existing or entrepreneur airline?
Noise, safety of overflights, and poten-
tial increases in surface traffic are
key community concerns.
Would potential passengers recognize
cost and service benefits of tiltrotors?
What assurances are needed for non-
Federal investors in tiltrotor
technology and what is the Federal
role?
Administration has attempted to end the V-22 in fiscal
years 1990 and 1991; civil demonstration program
proposed in the NASA/FAA Phase II study.
Waterfront, industrial, underused small airports, and
nonurban interstate sites appear plausible; residential
and central business district locations doubtful;
multiple-use facilities could help limit development
costs for vertiport portion.
Rotorcraft have never been well integrated into the
airspace system; no public heliport in the United
States now has precision instrument landing
capabilities essential for scheduled passenger
operations. En route operations by tiltrotors are no
different than those by conventional aircraft, and FAA
has programs under way to enhance the capabilities of
en route airspace.
V-22 flight test data are being analyzed by FAA; air-
worthiness criteria for tiltrotor-type aircraft are
published (in interim form); vertiport planning
guidelines are available; airspace procedures are
being studied in simulators.
Lack of aircraft and infrastructure has dampened airline
interest; airlines will not voluntarily free up airport
capacity for competitors; scheduled passenger
helicopter service, in some respects comparable to
tiltrotor, is virtually nonexistant in the United States.
With appropriate airspace procedures, vertiports and
their operations could be isolated from residential
areas; some planning analyses are under way (e.g.,
FAA vertiport studies).
Safety and service levels at least comparable to large
commuter operations required; total direct ground and
air costs to passengers could be less than current air
options in certain markets. How do travelers value
ground access time and cost?
Public and private investment in the United States
limited primarily to planning and design studies to
date; new heliports are being designed to vertiport
standards; no commitment to develop commercial
tiltrotor in the United States.
Source: U.S. Congress, OTA, New Ways, OTA-SET-507, October 1991, p. 51
(Navy Oceanography and AF Air Weather). Also available in the weather area is
the National Center of Atmospheric Research (NCAR) which has been working
with the FAA on advanced aviation weather sensing and processing technology,
There were plans in 1991 for FAA, NOAA, and NASA to work together on a
revitalized wake vortex research program to reduce terminal area separation
standards which appears to have been abandoned. Such a program should proceed
as rapidly as possible since in the near term improved separation procedures, rather
than facility buildups, are the best hope for increased capacity, and wake vortex
research falls squarely into the type of research where governmental agencies can
pool their many talents for a potentially high payoff. Wake vortex alleviation was
predicted to result in airport capacity increases in the 10-15 percent range. There are
many other FAA/NASA cooperative programs in such areas as laminar flow, MLS
procedures, airborne windshear detection, TATCA, and airport-aircraft compatibility
(ROT and airport pavement). (The FAA Plan for RE&D [January 1989] or FAA 1990-
91 Aviation System Capacity Plan have detailed descriptions of the projects.)
The aviation community, working together, must establish a data base system which can
be used to estimate and forecast capacity and delay: clearly even a set of agreed upon
definitions of the basic terms would be a major accomplishment. Without agreed upon
definitions, such often quoted statements as "A one percent gain in capacity results in a
five percent reduction in the cost of delays" are generally meaningless. Since working
with the existing data bases can lead to erroneous or contradictory conclusions, it is
essential to establish such a uniform system to accurately determine the amount of delay
in the US air transportation system. This will, at least tangentially, indicate the state of
overall capacity in the system. It is particularly important to have an accurate system to
be able to establish trends for estimates of future developments.
4. Recommendations for NASA Research Activities
4.1 Airport Community Noise
Since the airport community noise problem is recognized as the fundamental, long
term cause of the lack airport capacity in the U.S., and the world's, air transport
system, noise research activities are of vital importance. The goals for such research
should be:
(a) Quietening aircraft noise at its source
(b) Moderating airport community annoyance
(c) Separating aircraft from the airport community
(a) Aircraft Noise
Research in this area should consider engine, airframe, rotor and fan noise. Current
transport vehicles (propeller aircraft and subsonic jets), as well as more advanced
vehicles such as high speed civil transports (HSCT) and civil tiltrotors (CTR) should
be included. Techniques for active suppression for fan engine noise and other
novel noise suppression techniques for propellor and rotor noise should be further
explored.
There is also a need to establish reasonable noise goals for further quietening of new
transport aircraft on a worldwide basis (i.e., Stage 4, Stage 5) since it is clear that the
achievement of all Stage 3 operations is not going to alleviate community objections
to airport noise.
(b) Moderating Annoyance
Research in this area should focus on psycho-acoustic responses of airport
communities to short-term and long-term noise exposure for varying event noise
levels and event frequency of occurrence. This should encompass long-term,
continuing field and laboratory work to gauge the psychological response of airport
listeners under a variety of circumstances; (e.g., after one, or two, or three hours of
continuous exposure, with different living or working conditions, after several
years of such airport exposure, etc.). The short term transient response is needed to
guide the introduction of noise relief by rotating the runways at a major airport
every few hours when possible.
Additionally, the tradeoff of peak overflight noise and number or frequency of
exposure events is still not well established. It is needed to understand future
problems as the daily number of flights at an airport continues to increase when
peak noise levels decrease as Stage 3 aircraft continue to enter the fleets of the U.S.
airlines. The current airport community noise measures, developed 20 years ago
when aircraft overflight noises were much more severe, are clearly inadequate as a
measurement in future situations.
(c) Separating Aircraft
Research is needed on methods of operating vehicles on various trajectories for
takeoff and landing to minimize exposure to noise from a single overflight on the
community.
With the advent of advanced flight control and guidance systems, it is possible to
consider flying complex trajectories for takeoff and landing which avoid placing
peak noise levels on the airport community.
One such path is a parabolic, constant deceleration approach path where the aircraft
decelerates horizontally at a constant rate while maintaining a fixed vertical rate of
descent. With microwave landing systems and flight management systems (FMS) it
would seem possible to safely fly such trajectories which offer higher altitudes and
lower power (and therefore lower noise impact). It is particularly appropriate for
helicopters and tiltrotors operating in city center areas, where for both noise and fuel
reasons it is desirable to minimize the time spent at hover or steep approach.
Finally, since the noise generating from any aircraft is not equally strong in all
directions, there can be advantages in flying a safe takeoff path which manages to
keep the aircraft from orienting its strongest noise at underlying communities. The
overall effectiveness of such techniques depends on the distribution of population
around an airport and its runways. Noise minimization profiles would be required
for each runway, gross weight, wind condition, etc., but could be generated by, or
stored in the FMS of modern transport aircraft.
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4.2 Civil Tiltrotor Vertiport System
To divert the short haul business air traveller from conventional air transport
aircraft and airports, it is necessary to demonstrate that a safe, economically viable,
and environmentally acceptable system of vertiports can be built. Research must be
concentrated in the following areas:
(a) CTR Noise Research to Allow Community Acceptance
(b) Precision Flight Paths for CTRs
(c) Improved CTR Technology
(a) CTR - Community Noise Research
Although vertiports would theoretically be located in urban areas where there is a
high level of ambient noise, very frequent helicopter flights over cities have
proven objectionable. Research is needed on CTR approach and departure noise
patterns during vertiport operations and on community reaction to these CTR
operations. Flight demonstrations will be a necessary part of this process.
(b) CTR Precision Flight Paths
In conjunction with studies on noise patterns, research is needed on precision
guidance for decelerating approach transitions that will minimize noise. Also
required are studies on wake effects from simultaneous operations at vertiports.
(c) Improved CTR Technologies
This topic requires research to achieve lower operating costs and improved
operational reliability of the vehicle, including improved rotor performance and
reduced noise. To overcome some of the hesitation of potential airline clients,
research is also needed to evaluate acquisition and operational costs of CTR systems.
4.3 Precision Flight Path Capability
Increasing capacity in the air traffic control system requires reducing the separation
criteria used for safe separation. Current ATC systems impose large separations
between aircraft in non-visual conditions because it has not been possible to specify
and then fly precisely defined paths in two, three, and four dimensions. In order to
increase capacity in the ATC system, it will be necessary to introduce precision flight
path capability. To achieve this capability, there is no need to invent new
technologies, but there is a need to demonstrate and apply existing technologies.
These technologies are in the following areas:
1. Aircraft Navigation (2-D, 3-D, 4-D)
2. Aircraft Guidance
3. Surveillance of Aircraft and Weather
4. Air/Ground Data Communications.
To demonstrate that the technologies for precision flight path capability are ready for
use in the ATC systems, the following topics require further research.
(a) Monitoring & Intervention of Abnormal Divergences
Improved methods of monitoring cross-track velocity are needed for aircraft which
suddenly diverge from the runway centerline (e.g., downlink heading, turn rate, or
bank angle). In general, there is a need for improved ground surveillance and
"intelligent" tracking of aircraft which uses information on current aircraft state to
avoid transient errors in estimating groundspeed and direction when aircraft are
maneuvering. This requires downlinking of aircraft state information.
Improved methods to determine and communicate a safe escape maneuver for the
non-diverging aircraft on the other approach path are needed. At the same time, a
safe recovery maneuver for the diverging aircraft is being established. While TCAS
will be available, its transient response is poor, and there is a need for an improved
cockpit display of relative position and speed, and short term intended path. This
information can be displayed on the basic horizontal situation display used for
approach.
(b) Precision Guidance in the Departure Area
Better methods are needed to define and fly precision paths in the area beyond the
runway to ensure safety in the event of single or multiple simultaneous missed
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approaches, and in the event of contingency departures (i.e., an engine failure or
other emergency).
These paths are complex, may start from various points, may include turns and
climbs, and may be performed with a single engine failure or other emergency.
Aircraft performance to ensure obstacle clearance is critical.
Paths could be tailored to each runway, its obstacles, current air traffic operations,
aircraft gross weight, winds, temperature, etc. Modern FMS can select best paths and
present it to the pilots and controllers.
By defining them, tighter, higher capacity terminal area ATC procedures can be
operated safely.
(c) Deviation Detection, Oceanic Parallel Track Systems
Currently there is no monitoring and intervention system for Oceanic ATC since
surveillance and communication are inadequate. Track systems with 60nm lateral
spacing are defined each day to optimize travel time and organize traffic flow on
certain routes.
While the lateral conformance of aircraft in the traffic mix keeps improving and the
GPS system promises further improvements, the safety criteria for track spacing
become dominated by the rare occurrences of abnormal deviations.
To reduce to 30 nm. lateral spacings, it will be necessary to develop some method of
detecting abnormal lateral deviations due to failures by humans or equipment.
(d) Hybrid Navigation Management Systems
It is likely that the aviation world will begin using multiple systems to obtain
navigation information in the future rather than a single world system. ICAO is
establishing RNP (Required Navigation Performance), which is a classification
system describing the navigation (and guidance capability) of each aircraft. ATC
rules and procedures would then be based on this classification system.
There is a need for research to establish a basis for describing the performance of
hybrid navigation systems which use multiple sensors (GPS, Glonass, Loran-C,
Omega, Inertial, Multiple DME, etc.). It is needed for certification of various hybrid
forms of aircraft Navigation Management Systems, for setting a basis for RNP, and
for examining how a reliable, real time, cockpit indication of navigation accuracy
can be developed for any combination of sensors.
(e) Trajectory Prediction for Climbing/Descending Aircraft
Current ATC practice does not require aircraft conformance to either 3-D or 4-D
paths. There would be significant improvement in traffic handling capacity around
busy airports if climb/descent trajectories for subsonic transports could be predicted
with better accuracy. Currently little knowledge is obtained about the winds and
temperatures which vary along the flight paths over short periods of 5-20 minutes.
Climb performance depends on current gross weight, speed and engine thrust
profiles used, and the actual performance of engines. There can be significant
variation within a fleet of supposedly identical aircraft.
Descent performance can be made independent of aircraft type or engine
performance by specifying a "Constant Profile Descent" where aircraft fly a specified
constant Mach/IAS and rate of descent.
There is a research need to determine how accurately the Climb and Descent
trajectories of transport jet aircraft can be predicted 5-20 minutes ahead given good
forecasts of winds/temperatures and surveillance of their current performance.
There is also the issue of defining a 3-D path and requiring conformance to it using
advanced FMS.
(t) Airborne Wake Vortex Detection on Final Approach
The possible persistence of strong wake vortices behind heavy aircraft at low speed
on final approach has introduced extra longitudinal separations between aircraft
even though they are not needed on most days. It has been observed that longer
persistence occurs only under certain weather conditions (low wind speeds and a
stable atmosphere).
It is operationally desirable for the pilots to be able to detect the location and strength
of the wake vortices from a preceding aircraft at distances of 1-5 nm. If possible,
their relative height is also needed.
For the case of converging or crossing runway operations in poor visibility, it is also
desirable to be able to detect a crossing vortex in front of an aircraft.
(g) Reduction of Separations in Final Approach Area
Currently, a radar separation of 3 nm. applies under every situation in the final area
except after the Outer Marker of an ILS precision approach where it is relaxed to 2.5
nm. as aircraft reduce from a maneuvering speed of 170 kts. IAS to their approach
speeds (around 140 kts.)
For certain situations such as merging a slower aircraft behind a faster, and for
aircraft established "in-trail" at similar speeds, it is clear that 3 nm. could be safely
reduced. With newer automation systems which provide reliable assistance to the
final spacing controller such as the Final Approach Spacing Tool (FAST) in the
Center/Tracon Automation System (CTAS) developed by NASA Ames, the issue of
tightening these separation criteria arises. It is desirable to switch to time based
separation criteria for higher capacity landing rates.
With advanced FMS in aircraft and a reliable air-ground datalink, it will be possible
to issue "digital vectors" for complex 3-D or 4-D paths to be flown with good
conformance.
There is need to develop a methodology which defines safe time-based separations
for merging and final spacing in a much more comprehensive way for such
advanced scenarios. It should be dependent on the expected conformance
capabilities of each aircraft.
(h) Air-Ground Integrated VoicelDigital Communication
There are Human Factors problems for both the pilots and controllers in
introducing a second mode of air-ground communications called "digital vectors" as
postulated in (g). A second area of research must be undertaken if higher landing
and takeoff capacities are to be achieved.
In the automated terminal environments foreseen by CTAS, research is needed to
understand the implications on safety and workload of the various alternatives for
integrating voice and digital messages in a busy terminal area.
55
4.4 Study Conclusions
Community reactions to noise around airports and vertiports is the long term
barrier to increasing the capacity of the nation's air transport system. More airports
or vertiports must be built around major cities to accommodate the long term
growth expected in air transport. Noise research is needed to understand
community long-term and transient annoyance to quieter operations.
There are valuable returns from exploiting existing technology to reduce current
ATC separation criteria used in Oceanic and Terminal areas. To demonstrate safe
reductions, it is necessary to introduce the capability for Precision Flight along 3-D
and 4-D paths to a majority of aircraft in the traffic flow.
There is a need to provide evidence of the economic, environmental, and
operational viability of a CTR Short Haul Air Transport System to support decisions
by federal and local government, and the aviation industry to embark on a long-
term CTR development program.
Finally, an overview of alternative measures that can be taken to improve the
capacity of the air transportation system is shown in Figure 21. This report has
focused on noise research, ATC and aircraft technology measures, and civil
tiltrotors, all items which are coupled through advanced vehicle technology. Since
NASA, or at least the aeronautics part of NASA, has principal responsibility to
foster technological development of air transport vehicles, it is in this role that it is
fitting for NASA to commit resources to improving capacity of the U.S. airspace
system.
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FIGURE 21:
OVERVIEW OF CAPACITY IMPROVEMENT
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Acronyms
ADS
AERA
ARTCC
ATC
ATOMS
CAB
CTOL
CTR
DME
DOD
DOT
EPA
FAA
FMS
FSS
GA
GNP
GPS
HSCT
IAS
ICAO
IFR
ILS
MAGLEV
MLS
NACA
NAS
NASA
NCAR
NEXRAD
NOAA
PFC
RE&D
RNP
RTOL
SDRS
TATCA
TCAS
VFR
V/STOL
VTOL
Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Automated En Route Air Traffic Control
Air Route Traffic Control Center
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Operations Management System
Civil Aeronautics Board
Conventional Takeoff and Landing
Civil Tiltrotor
Distance Measuring Equipment
Department of Defense
Department of Transportation
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Aviation Administration
Flight Management System
Flight Service Station
General Aviation
Gross National Product
Global Positioning System
High Speed Civil Transport
Indicated Air Speed
International Civil Aviation Organization
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrument Landing System
Magnetic Levitation
Microwave Landing System
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Airspace System
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Center of Atmospheric Research
Next Generation Weather Radar
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Passenger Facility Charge
Research, Engineering and Development
Required Navigation Performance
Reduced Takeoff and Landing
Standardized Delay Reporting System
Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
Visual Flight Rules
Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing
Vertical Takeoff and Landing
